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auspicious point, the debut of the first general-interest issue. Everyone associated 
with the Law Review and the Law School will be forever in his debt. 
  
2013 Cat, Cause, and Kant 3 
 
“Imagine there’s a cat lying on the floor in the living room. A 
ball comes rolling into the room. What does the cat do?” 
“I’ve tried that lots of times. The cat will run after the 
ball.” 
“All right. Now imagine that you were sitting in that same 
room. If you suddenly see a ball come rolling in, would you 
also start running after it?” 
“First, I would turn around to see where the ball came 
from.” 
“Yes, because you are a human being, you will inevitably look 
for the cause of every event, because the law of causality is 
part of your makeup.” 
“So Kant says.”1 
I. PITTING CAT AGAINST DOG 
n 2011 Chief Justice John Roberts mocked law review literature, 
characterizing the typical article in the contemporary review as an 
analysis of “the influence of Immanuel Kant on evidentiary 
approaches in 18th Century Bulgaria, or something.”2 He went for an 
easy laugh line, which paid off.3 Of course, the Chief was not speaking 
literally. But he was meaning to make a serious point about disconnect 
between the legal academy, as expressed through law reviews, and the 
legal practice, as experienced by lawyers and judges.4 The Chief meant 
to pick a fight. 
The first volley came back in a since widely cited blog posting 
from Professor Sherrilyn Ifill.5 She did not have to look hard for 
                                                 
1 JOSTEIN GAARDER, SOPHIE’S WORLD 324 (Paulette Miller trans., Farrar, Straus, 
Giroux, 2007). 
2 John Roberts, Chief Justice, Supreme Court of the United States, Remarks at the 
Annual Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals Judicial Conference 28:45–32:05 (June 
25, 2011), available at http://www.c-span.org/Events/Annual-Fourth-Circuit-
Court-of-Appeals-Conference/10737422476-1/. 
3 Id. 
4 Lee Petherbridge & David L. Schwartz, An Empirical Assessment of the 
Supreme Court’s Use of Legal Scholarship, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 995, 998 (2012). 
5 Danielle Cintron, Sherrilyn Ifill on What the Chief Justice Should Read on 
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examples of good scholarship with practical import, such as a 2007 
article on the Fourth Amendment implications of GPS tracking6: 
highly relevant to and prescient of the Supreme Court’s decision in the 
2012 Jones GPS tracking case.7 To Ifill, Roberts’ point was neither 
funny nor true.8 
The battle between the Chief Justice and Professor Ifill reflects an 
old but persistent conflict. Richard Brust, Assistant Managing Editor 
of the ABA Journal, filled in the history ably in an article for that 
magazine.9 Roberts’ position can be traced in recent times to a 1992 
missive by D.C. Circuit Judge Harry T. Edwards who, to much 
subsequent acclaim, lambasted “ivory-tower elitism.”10 But Brust, 
moreover, traced the quarrel over law review efficacy “practically to 
the origin of the American law journal,”11 marking its first citation in 
the high Court in 1897,12 its subsequent proliferation, and its first 
notorious torment by a ruthless critic in 1936.13 So Roberts and Ifill 
demonstrate the journalistic maxim that nothing happens for the first 
time.14 
This latest round of hostilities has been complemented by 
empirical research published in 2011 and 2012 by Professors Lee 
Petherbridge and David L. Schwartz.15 As summarized by Brust, the 
                                                 
6 Id. (citing Renee Hutchins, Tied Up in Knots: GPS Technology and the Fourth 
Amendment, 419 UCLA L. REV. 409 (2007)). 
7 See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
8 Ifill, supra note 5. 
9 See Richard Brust, The High Bench vs. the Ivory Tower, A.B.A. J (Feb. 1, 2012), 
http: //www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/the_high_bench_vs._the_ivory
_tower/. 
10 Id. (quoting Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal 
Education and the Legal Profession, 91. MICH. L. REV. 34 (1992)). 
11 Id. 
12 Id. (citing United States v. Trans-Mo. Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290, 350 n.1 
(1897) (White, J., dissenting) (citing Amasa M. Eaton, On Contracts in 
Restraint, 4 HARV. L. REV. 128 (1890))). 
13 Id. (quoting Fred Rodell, Goodbye to Law Reviews, 23 VA. L. REV. 38 (1937) 
(“The average law review writer is peculiarly able to say nothing with an air of 
great importance.”)). 
14 For my own first exposure to this maxim, I must credit Professors Hampden 
Smith, ret., and Brian Richardson, School of Journalism at Washington and Lee 
University. 
15 Brust, supra note 9 (citing David L. Schwartz & Lee Petherbridge, An Empirical 
Assessment of the Supreme Court’s Use of Legal Scholarship, 106 NW. U. L. 
REV. 995 (2012); David L. Schwartz & Lee Petherbridge, The Use of Legal 
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pair’s studies found increases in the use of legal scholarship by the 
federal courts with a thirty-two percent increase in the Supreme Court 
from 1949 to 2009.16 Especially interesting was a greater incidence of 
scholarly invocation amid divided courts with dissenting opinions.17 
And, as observers have been keen to point out since the Roberts 
comment, the Chief himself is no stranger to reliance on scholarship 
when it suits his interests18—for example, his controversial conclusion 
that lay at the heart of the Court’s 2012 healthcare decision in NFIB v. 
Sebelius was one espoused earlier by professors Robert Cooter and 
Neil Siegel.19 
Yet there remains something appealing about Chief Justice 
Roberts’ comment, something that resonates in our present collective 
perception of the law and legal education. Were Roberts’ claim simply 
a fabrication from whole cloth, it would not stick in the craw so. In 
fact, conditions were ripe for Roberts to re-ignite the old conflict.20 
Whether or not what he said was an accurate portrayal of law review 
literature, his jab reflected a deeper anxiety that has been aggravated 
amid the ongoing economic crisis.21 
Just five months after Roberts’ 2011 comment, David Segal again 
rattled legal academics and refueled the blogosphere with an article in 
The New York Times that harshly criticized law schools for failing to 
teach practice skills.22 And therein lay the true contemporary 
                                                                                                                   
Scholarship by the Federal Courts of Appeals: An Empirical Study, 96 CORNELL 
L. REV. 1345 (2011)). 
16 Id. (citing Petherbridge & Schwartz, supra note 15). 
17 Id. (citing Petherbridge & Schwartz, supra note 15). 
18 See e.g., Orin Kerr, Chief Justice Roberts Cites A Law Review Article (Not 
Written By Henry Friendly), THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (June 25, 2012, 3:14 
PM), http://www.volokh.com/2012/06/25/chief-justice-roberts-cites-a-law-
review-article-not-written-by-henry-friendly/. 
19 Andrew Cohen, Professors Provide Roadmap for Supreme Court Healthcare 
Ruling, (July 18, 2012), http://www.law.berkeley.edu/13778.htm. (citing Nat’l 
Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 567 U.S.__ (2012)). 
20 See Petherbridge & Schwartz, supra note 4. 
21 See JULIE MARETTA MORGAN, CENTER FOR AM. PROGRESS, WHAT CAN WE 
LEARN FROM LAW SCHOOL? LEGAL EDUCATION REFLECTS ISSUES FOUND IN 
ALL OF HIGHER EDUCATION 5, 8–11 (2011), available at http://www
.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2011/12/pdf/legal_education
.pdf. 
22 David Segal, What They Don’t Teach Law Students: Lawyering, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 19, 2011, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/20/business
/after-law-school-associates-learn-to-be-lawyers.html. 
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manifestation of the hornets’ nest that the Chief Justice nettled. 
Today’s handwringing over the efficacy of legal scholarship has less to 
do with the subject matters of the latest research and more to do with a 
broad-based reassessment of the very institutions of legal education 
and the legal profession.23 
Professor Frank Pasquale framed this bigger picture—in his words, 
“situat[ing Segal’s assault] as part of a neo-liberal ideology developing 
at the Times and other scriveners for the powerful.”24 To Pasquale, 
Roberts’ characterization of legal scholarship as “pure self-
indulgence” was of the same ilk as Segal’s crusade on behalf of legal 
education reformers, and neither has the rule of law at heart.25 
Pasquale leveled the guns of realism at these critics and fired: 
To ignore the political roots of the decline of both law and 
the rule of law in the US (and its obvious impact on attorney 
employment) is to fail to even begin a serious analysis of young 
lawyers’ problems. . . . [Segal] never considers how legal 
education works to prompt legal challenges to corporate 
wrongdoing. No one will have a job defending corporations if 
there aren’t well-trained attorneys applying old law to new 
corporate wrongdoing. That takes creative thought, a chance to 
learn the policy behind law, and engagement with current industry 
trends. It’s not something to be drilled into people by projecting 
bar prep rote back into law school. 
. . . . 
Segal never stops to ask: Why might a Justice like 
Roberts want to discredit the legal academy? . . . Perhaps it’s 
because Roberts, after long years in corporate practice, sees law 
profs’ efforts to reinterpret old statutes and doctrines in light of 
new harms . . . as one more nuisance for the clients who made him 
a rich and powerful man?26 
Roberts’ criticism of law review literature was, thus, a shot across only 
one front of a much broader conflict. 
                                                 
23 See, e.g., Patrick G. Lee, Law Schools Get Practical, WALL ST. J., July 11, 2011, 
at B5, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405270230479
3504576434074172649718.html; MORGAN, supra note 21. 
24 Frank Pasquale, New York Times Financial Advice: Be an Unpaid Intern 
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And indeed, a war is on. The economic crisis has spawned 
unprecedented levels of student debt27 and lawyer unemployment,28 
absurdly juxtaposed with unaffordable legal services and a crisis in 
unmet legal needs.29 Plenty of pointing fingers place blame. The 
informal system of training lawyers through theoretical preparation in 
law school followed by skills education through practice-based 
mentoring has collapsed.30 On the legal practice side, economically 
squeezed business models are no longer willing to allocate resources to 
training and expect newly minted lawyers to be “practice ready.” On 
the legal education side, law schools are expected to continue 
conferring theoretical foundation and professional acculturation, to 
teach more black-letter content, to qualify general practitioners across 
increasingly complex specializations, and moreover to assume 
responsibility for practical training, all while slashing costs and 
holding fast to a three-year time frame. 
Whether the conflict is between Segal and Pasquale, Roberts and 
Ifill, or the practice and the ivory tower, our fundamental legal 
institutions seem teetering on a precipice of transformation. 
Uncertainty over what that transformation will mean has everyone on 
edge. 
II. MAKING COMMON CAUSE 
These are precarious times in which to launch a new law school 
and a new law review. Yet here we are. The University of 
Massachusetts is now in its first year of operation with provisional 
ABA accreditation.31 This text is a foreword to the first general-
interest issue of the University of Massachusetts Law Review. Now 
                                                 
27 See MORGAN, supra note 21, at 8–11. 
28 Id. at 9–10, 12–14 figs. 4–6. 
29 See MIDDLE INCOME ACCESS TO JUSTICE 3–4 (Michael Trebilcock et al. eds., 
2012). 
30 See Malcolm Richard Wilkey, What Role for the Law School in American Legal 
Education? Purposefully Restructuring the Law School Curriculum, 1981 BYU 
L. REV. 1, 3 (1981) (“There seems to be an emerging consensus that the third 
year as now constituted is virtually useless for all but law review students.”); 
Patrick J. Rohan, Legal Education and Training for the Profession—An 
Overview, 50 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 494, 495–96 (1975). 
31 Memorandum from American Bar Association, Provisional Approval of the 
University of Massachusetts School of Law–Dartmouth (June 12, 2012) (on file 
with the American Bar Association). 
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marks an appropriate time to take stock of what these institutions mean 
to accomplish in our unsettled legal world. 
UMass is the first, and only, public law school in the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts,32 and the mission of the school 
accords with that role.33 The University Board of Trustees created 
UMass Law on December 10, 2009, and on February 2, 2009, the 
Massachusetts Board of Higher Education authorized awarding of the 
juris doctor degree.34 The first UMass Law class graduated in 2011,35 
an inaugural alumni cohort inherited from the predecessor Southern 
New England School of Law.36 The first 1L class to enroll in UMass 
Law now constitutes the Editorial Board of this Law Review and will 
join the alumni ranks in 2013.37 
The UMass Law mission accords with its uniquely public role and 
stands in congruence with the particular position of the University of 
Massachusetts-Dartmouth within the Commonwealth. The law school 
mission includes commitments to: (1) balanced incorporation of 
doctrinal, skills-and-values, and experiential learning; (2) access to 
legal education; (3) civic engagement, public service, and 
professionalism; and (4) preparation and motivation of graduates to 
contribute to their communities and to the profession.38 Thus, the law 
school aims specially to meet public legal needs with a capable legal 
workforce. 
That said, UMass Law is much more than a vocational training 
ground. The lawyer as compassionate counsel, as public servant, as 
                                                 
32 See Tracy Jan, UMass Wins Approval for Public Law School, BOS. GLOBE, Feb. 
3, 2010, at A1, available at http://www.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts
/articles/2010/02/03/umass_wins_approval_for_states_first_public_law_school/. 
33 Mission Statement, UMASS SCHOOL OF LAW (last visited Dec. 3, 2012), 
http://www.umassd.edu/law/about/profile/missionstatement/. 
34 See Minutes of the Meeting of the UMass Board of Trustees 5–6, 8–11 (Dec. 10, 
2009) (on file with law review); see also History, UMASS SCHOOL OF LAW (last 
visited Dec. 3, 2012), http: //www.umassd.edu/law/about/profile/history/. 
35 See Press Release, UMass School of Law, First UMass Law Class to Graduate 
(May 10, 2011), available at http://www1.umassd.edu/communications/articles
/showarticles.cfm?a_key=2910. 
36 See Press Release, UMass School of Law, First 53 UMass Law Graduates 
Conferred Degrees (May 21, 2011), available at http://www1.umassd.edu
/communications/articles/showarticles.cfm?a_key=2917. 
37 See Tracy Jan, Strong Start for UMass Law, BOS. GLOBE, July 6, 2010, A1, 
available at http://www.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/articles/2010/07
/06/strong_start_for_umass_law/. 
38 Mission Statement, supra note 33. 
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legislator or judge or councilperson, or otherwise as public 
policymaker must be fluent in the law so much more thoroughly and 
so much more intimately than the lawyer as mere client advocate. The 
lawyer of public conscience must know the why of law as well as the 
what: the history, rationale, and theoretical underpinning of the law as 
much as its issues, rules, and applications.39 In pursuit of its mission, 
the law school—not only as educator of students, but as continuing 
educator of bar, bench, and public—faces a formidable task, yet aims 
to fulfill a function that is foundational and essential to perpetuating 
the rule of law in the Commonwealth and beyond.40 
Before us is a course both redoubtable and exhilarating. In its 
nascence, UMass Law will be subject to the push and pull of would-be 
reformers and their opponents, of critics and champions, of Robertses 
and Ifills, and of Segals and Pasquales.41 To make its way, the law 
school will itself have to plunge from the precipice. Hand-in-hand with 
bar, bench, and public, the people of UMass Law will discover the 
next great transformation and will redefine legal education for its role 
in a new economic order. 
The UMass Law Review is the public face of UMass Law’s 
leadership in this course. Contrary to the catcalls of the critics, the 
empirical record is now plain that law reviews do matter.42 In their 
pages can be found the ideas, the data, and the templates to tackle the 
challenges our society faces,43 from the unmet needs for healthcare 
and legal services to the preservation of civil liberties and the rule of 
                                                 
39 ELIZABETH MERTZ, THE LANGUAGE OF LAW SCHOOL: LEARNING HOW TO 
“THINK LIKE A LAWYER” 1 (2007) (quoting CHRISTOPHER C. LANGDELL, A 
SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS, at vi (1871)). 
40 See Mission Statement, supra note 33; see also Jerome M. Organ, Legal 
Education and the Legal Profession: Convergence or Divergence?, 38 OHIO 
N.U. L. REV. 885, 901 (2012) (relating legal education to the access to justice 
problem). 
41 See Ifill, supra note 5; Segal, supra note 22; Pasquale, supra note 24. 
42 See e.g., Timothy M. Tymkovich, The Law Review and the Judiciary, 75 U. 
COLO. L. REV. [i–vi] (2004) (concluding that law reviews do matter). 
43 See Daphna Hacker, Law and Society Jurisprudence, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 727, 
728 (2010) (“I believe it is clear that the law and society community must 
maintain its flexible, open, and dynamic boundaries. It is this openness that 
allows one to challenge the positivistic perception of the law and of science and 
to produce reflective and complex knowledge.”). See, e.g., Nelson Tebbe & 
Deborah A. Widiss, Equal Access and the Right to Marry, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 
1375–83 (2009) (discussing the right to marry as an issue of equal access to 
government). 
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law.44 If great effect is what we seek, the law review holds the 
potential of great cause. Accordingly, the University of Massachusetts 
Law Review, through its general-interest and symposia publications, 
will further the worthy mission of the Commonwealth’s first and only 
public law school. 
III. FINDING KANT 
Will the reader find in the future pages of this law review a 
treatment of Kantian influence on eighteenth-century Bulgarian 
evidence law? 
Maybe. 
To give Immanuel Kant his due, his thinking about perception and 
reality revolutionized philosophy.45 He concluded that human 
understanding of reality would always be limited by the filter of 
perception.46 Moreover, he situated the relationship between cause and 
effect as an inescapable artifact of perception.47 These declarations, 
based on Kant’s observations in the 1700s, turned out strangely 
coincident with quantum theory two centuries later.48 Surely there is 
something here to be said about legal evidence, perhaps concerning the 
limits of eyewitness testimony, or about proof of causation as a jury 
question of fact. 
And let’s not be too quick to sell short eighteenth-century 
Bulgaria. The Istoriya Slavyanobolgarskaya, written in 1762 by Saint 
                                                 
44 See Thom Ringer, Note, Development, Reform, and the Rule of Law: Some 
Prescriptions for a Common Understanding of the “Rule of Law” and its Place 
in Development Theory and Practice, 10 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 178 
(2007) (discussing scholarly focus on the rule of law). See, e.g., Peter J. Kalis & 
Judy Hlafcsak, Healthcare Reform: Let’s Act Locally, 50 DUQ. L. REV. 253, 
256–58 (2012) (noting the need for a change in the way we deliver healthcare). 
45 2 NORMAN MELCHERT, THE GREAT CONVERSATION 435 (3d ed. 1999) 
(discussing Kant’s “Copernican Revolution”). 
46 See BERTRAND RUSSELL, A HISTORY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY 707–08 (19th 
prtg. 1945). 
47 Id. 
48 See EDWARD G. STEWART, QUANTUM MECHANICS: ITS EARLY DEVELOPMENT 
AND THE ROAD TO ENTANGLEMENT 181–82 (2008); see also Erwin Schrodinger, 
The Present Situation in Quantum Mechanics: A Translation of Schrodinger’s 
“Cat Paradox” Paper, 124 PROC. OF THE AM. PHIL. SOC’Y 323, 328 (John D. 
Trimmer trans., 1980) (contemplating the fate of the infamous cat). 
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Paisius of Hilendar,49 marked the beginning of the Bulgarian national 
revival and the beginning of the end for Ottoman rule.50 As an 
embodiment of cultural pride, the Istoriya represents an important 
statement about the resilience of human identity and, in turn, the 
importance of self-determination to the democratic political 
enterprise.51 
The experience of Bulgaria at that transformational point in its 
history was consistent with Kant’s conclusions on politics.52 Kant 
propounded his theory on republicanism in his 1797 Metaphysics of 
Morals,53 and he defined a state’s legitimacy exclusively in terms of its 
united people.54 Kant went so far as to challenge the propriety of 
majority rule over the free will of the individual dissenter, a line of 
thinking that very much animates modern civil libertarianism.55 
Today our U.S. Supreme Court struggles to adapt aged norms to 
modern circumstances: the freedom of expression pitted against 
corporatized politics,56 or the freedom from unreasonable search and 
seizure pitted against GPS technology.57 I refuse to rule out the 
possibility that even Chief Justice Roberts could mine something 
useful from Immanuel Kant58 or the Istoriya.59 
                                                 
49 PAISIUS OF HILENDAR, История славянобългарска, [History of Slavonic 
Bulgaria] (1762), available at http://www.istoriata.bg/ (Bulgarian). 
50 See R. J. CRAMPTON, A CONCISE HISTORY OF BULGARIA 45–46 (2d ed. 2005). 
But see DONALD QUATAERT, THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE: 1700–1922, at 176–77 (2d 
ed. 2005) (arguing that the impact of Saint Paisius and the Bulgarian national 
revival was exaggerated to discredit Ottoman rule). 
51 See CRAMPTON, supra note 50, at 45–46; see also R. J. CRAMPTON, BULGARIA 
18–95 (2007) (describing the origins of Bulgarian national identity and modern 
statehood). 
52 Compare FREDERICK B. CHARY, HISTORY OF BULGARIA 26–29 (2011), with 
IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 112–13 (Mary Gregor ed., 
trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1996) (1797). 
53 KANT, supra note 52. 
54 Id. at 112–13. 
55 See James R. Otteson, Kantian Individualism and Political Libertarianism, 13 
INDEP. REV. 389, 395 (2009). 
56 See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
57 See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
58 KANT supra note 52; see also Grant Timber & Mfg. Co. v. Gray, 236 U.S. 133, 
134 (1915) (Holmes, J.) (mentioning Kant); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 514 
(1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (citing IMMANUEL KANT, THE CRITIQUE OF 
PURE REASON, in 42 GREAT BOOKS 221(1952)); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 
261 (1962) (Clark, J., concurring) (citing generally IMMANUEL KANT, 
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What, then, will the reader find in the future pages of this law 
review? 
I cannot say whether the Law Review and its future leaders will 
choose to take up Kant, or Bulgaria, or evidence law in the 1700s. I 
can say that in the pages of this review, authors will explore the 
education, practice, and profession of law, governance, and civic 
engagement. The editors of this law review will always seek the 
betterment of the bar, the bench, and the public. This law review will 
be dedicated to the mission of UMass Law, to the people of the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts and the society of which it is a part, 
and to the rule of law in human civilization. 
I invite you to turn the page and to join our enterprise. This is the 
University of Massachusetts Law Review. 
“Yes, the material of our knowledge comes to us through the 
senses, but this material must conform to the attributes of 
reason. For example, one of the attributes of reason is to seek 
the cause of an event.” 
“Like the ball rolling across the floor.” 
“If you like. But when we wonder where the world came 
from—and then discuss possible answers—reason is in a sense 
‘on hold.’ For it has no sensory material to process, no 
experience to make use of, because we have never experienced 
the whole of the great reality that we are a tiny part of.” 
                                                                                                                   
PERPETUAL PEACE); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 68 n.14 (1972) (White, J.) 
(citing Grant Timber, 236 U.S. at 134); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 581 n.10 
(1979) (citing IMMANUEL KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 195–198 (W. Hastie 
transl. 1887); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 
U.S. 614, 665 n.41 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Immanuel Kant, 
Perpetual Peace, A Philosophical Sketch, in KANT’S POLITICAL WRITINGS 93 
(H. Reiss, ed. 1971)); Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 698 n.9 (1986) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 
198–199 (1977) (mentioning Kant)). 
59 HILENDAR supra note 49. Certainly, the Chief Justice—who majored in history 
at Harvard College and graduated with highest honors, who aspired to be a 
historian, and who once said, “In studying world history, I was very wide-eyed. 
I was a kid from a small town learning about a much bigger world. It was 
exciting”—could find something of value in a nation’s defining historical 
account. See LISA TUCKER MCELROY, JOHN G. ROBERTS, JR: CHIEF JUSTICE 14–
15 (2006). 
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“We are—in a way—a tiny part of the ball that comes 
rolling across the floor. So we can’t know where it 
came from.” 
“But it will always be an attribute of human reason to ask 
where the ball comes from. That’s why we ask and ask, we 
exert ourselves to the fullest to find answers to all the deepest 
questions.”60 
                                                 
60 GAARDER, supra note 1, at 326. 
